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While global demand for fossil fuel 
sources is rising, conventional oil 
production is on the decline,1 due 
principally to three factors: the non-
renewability of conventional oil, its 
natural tendency to deplete, and 
disruptive responses to the social and 
environmental risks posed by 
conventional oil production.2 Although 
1 International Energy Agency World Energy 
Outlook 2016, Executive Summary 6. Available at 
https://www.iea.org/publications/freepublications/p
ublication/WorldEnergyOutlook2016ExecutiveSu
mmaryEnglish.pdf (accessed 10 July 2017).  
2 Höö M et al “Decline and depletion rates of oil 
production: a comprehensive investigation”, 
Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society 
(2012) 7. Available at 
http://rsta.royalsocietypublishing.org/content/roypt
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some new conventional oil finds have recently been made in a number of countries, 
such as, Tanzania, Egypt and Senegal, international oil companies are intensely 
competing for access to unconventional oil sources, such as, oil (or tar) sands and shale 
oil, despite the technical difficulties of exploiting them and the extremely higher 
environmental risks they carry.3 Before the 2014 drop in oil prices, oil sands were “the 
most commercially” viable unconventional oil resource.4 They are found in commercial 
deposits in limited parts of the world, with Canada and Venezuela accounting for a great 
share of total global deposits.5 The deposits are present in a number of Sub-Saharan 
African countries as well, particularly Angola, Madagascar, Nigeria and Republic of 
Congo, all of which are in the early development planning stages of the exploitation of 
the resources6 although reports suggest that development has advanced the most in 
Madagascar.7 While the drop in oil prices has led to a number of investment 
divestments in Alberta, Canada (mainly by foreign companies), the prices are rising 
gradually and, moreover, even minor profits could mean much for most African 
countries given their poverty levels. Also, with sustained technological advances, 
production costs as well as environmental risks might plummet, resulting in renewed 
investment interest in the oil sands and higher profits for African countries.8  
Due to the notorious “resource curse” history of oil in Sub-Saharan Africa, 
concerns have already rent the air regarding the potential human and environmental 
risks exploitation of the resources poses to local communities in the region.9 In Alberta, 
Canada, where oil sands development has been taking place energetically for decades 
until the investment pull-back following the 2014 price downturn, such investments 
have also been intensely criticized for their socio-environmental impacts, particularly 
due to the greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions from oil sands production estimated to be 
several times higher than those from conventional oil production.10 When coupled with 
issues of weak governance prevalent in Sub-Saharan Africa, oil sands development in 
the region raises even more concerns. This has led to calls for a freeze on oil sands 
development in Sub-Saharan Africa until its potential socio-environmental risks have 
3 Wykes S “Locking up the future: Unconventional oil in Africa” (December 2011) 4. Available at 
https://foeeurope.org/sites/default/files/publications/foee_locking_up_the_future_hbs_1111.pdf (accessed 10 
July 2017). 
4 Wykes (2011) 4. 
5 Meyer RF, Attanasi ED & Freeman PA “Heavy oil and natural bitumen resources in geological basins of the 
world”, USGS Open File-Report 2007–1084 2. Available at https://pubs.usgs.gov/of/2007/1084/OF2007-
1084v1.pdf (accessed 10 July 2017).  
6 Wykes (2011) 5. 
7 Heinrich Böll Foundation & Friends of the Earth Europe “Marginal oil: ahat is driving oil companies dirtier 
and deeper?” (2012) 7. Available at http://www.mtvsz.hu/dynamic/marginal_oil_2011.pdf (accessed 10 July 
2017).  
8 Nwapi C & Nliam O “EIA legislation and sustainable development of oil sands projects in Madagascar: a 
critical assessment” (2017) 35(4) Journal of Energy and Natural Resources Law 2. 
9 See, eg, Heinrich Böll Foundation, “Energy futures: ENI’s investments in tar sands and palm oil in the Congo 
Basin” (2009) 3. Available at https://www.boell.de/sites/default/files/091109_Energy_Futures_Congo_Oil.pdf 
(accessed 10 July 2017). 
10 See Nwapi C “A review of environmental enforcement culture in Alberta in relation to the oil sands”, CIRL 
Occasional Paper #40, March 2013, 1. Available at 
http://dspace.ucalgary.ca/bitstream/1880/49462/1/EnforcementOP40w.pdf (accessed 12 July 2017).  
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been fully assessed.11 Given Alberta’s decades-old experience with oil sands 
development, it would be proper for Sub-Saharan African countries to consider what 
lessons they can learn from Alberta to promote the sustainable development of the 
resource and reduce its negative socio-environmental impacts. This article seeks to 
identify key features of the oil sands governance regime in Alberta that can be taken as 
lessons for Sub-Saharan Africa. 
By “governance” is meant “the systems of authoritative norms, rules, institutions, 
and practices by means of which any collectivity … manages its common affairs”.12 
Governance is thus different from government although the government also 
participates in governance and in fact co-ordinates the system of governance – the 
relationships among the different societal actors. Writing recently about oil and gas 
development in Alberta, Wanvik notes the existence of “governance innovations” 
constructed around three interconnected developments: governance as: a multi-
stakeholder approach, a “pragmatic” and “consensus-seeking” approach, and a “parallel 
emergence of corporate social responsibility as stakeholder management”.13 The 
takeaway from his analyses is that governance in the oil and gas sector in Alberta has 
evolved towards the creation of instruments to manage the complex relationships 
among the multiple stakeholders in the industry. At the most basic level, those 
stakeholders are the government, industry and Aboriginal people (or the public). 
Wanvik identifies three governance instruments adopted in Alberta: duty to consult 
Aboriginal peoples, environmental impact assessments (EIAs) and impact benefit 
agreements (IBAs).  
Wanvik’s approach is useful but too narrow for the purposes of this article. While 
I recognize the existence of the “governance innovations” he highlights, my approach 
will focus on the broader features of the governance instruments rather than only on 
how those instruments promote communication and deliberation among stakeholders, 
which, however, will also be apparent in my analysis of the instruments. Also, I will 
consider an additional governance feature of oil sands development in Alberta without 
which sustainable development of the oil sands would remain a mere wishful 
expression – environmental enforcement. My principal argument is that these four 
governance features of oil sands development in Alberta (ie, EIAs, duty to consult, IBAs, 
and environmental enforcement) contain lessons that Sub-Saharan African 
governments can adapt to their own local circumstances for the sustainable 
development of oil sands projects in their respective countries.  
The balance of this article is divided as follows. Section 2 examines legal 
transplant theory to ascertain the transplantability of Alberta’s governance regime for 
oil sands development into Sub-Saharan Africa. Section 3 sets forth the governance 
11 Heinrich Böll Foundation (2009) 4. Similar calls have since been issued in Alberta. See Magill B “Scientists 
call for halt to Canada’s oil sands growth” Scientific American (10 June 2015). Available at 
https://www.scientificamerican.com/article/scientists-call-for-halt-to-canada-s-oil-sands-growth/ (accessed 12 
July 2017). 
12 Ruggie J “Global governance and ‘new governance theory’: lessons from business and human rights” (2014) 
20 Global Governance 5. 
13 Wanvik TI “Governance transformed into corporate social responsibility (CSR): new governance innovations 
in the Canadian oil sands” (2016) 3 EIS 521. 
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architecture for oil sands development in Alberta as established under the Canadian 
Constitution, with a view to identifying the various levels of governance relevant to oil 
sands development in Alberta and the extent of authority the Alberta government has to 
formulate strategies to promote sustainable development of the oil sands. Section 4 
then explains Alberta’s sustainable development strategy for the oil sands. Section 5 
analyses the four governance features of oil sands development in Alberta identified 
above, while Section 6 examines the transplantability of Alberta’s governance regime in 
Sub-Saharan Africa. Section 7 concludes the discussion. The principal thesis of this 
article is twofold: (1) Alberta’s governance regime for oil sands development holds vast 
lessons for Sub-Saharan African countries with oil sands deposits; and (2) while there 
are significant socio-economic and political differences between Alberta and Sub-
Saharan African countries, a successful legal transplant of the Alberta governance 
regime to Sub-Saharan Africa is very possible. 
2 LEGAL TRANSPLANT THEORY 
According to the Oxford English Dictionary, “to transplant” means to “remove and 
displace”, to “transport to another country or place of residence”. From a legal 
perspective, the transplant occurs across legal jurisdictions. As defined by Watson, legal 
transplant is “the moving of a rule ... from one country to another, or from one people to 
another”.14 Watson believes that this is “socially easy”15 because there is no meaningful 
connection between rules and “historical factors and habits of thought”.16 Since 
Watson’s pioneering work, different views on legal transplant have emerged in the 
discourse, some scholars, such as Legrand, denying the possibility of legal transplant 
altogether,17 while others offer different views of it. Ewald, for instance, divides 
Watson’s theory into “strong Watson” and “weak Watson”, strong Watson being wholly 
unconnected with society while weak Watson retains some cultural connection. 18 
Drawing on observations from Montesquieu, Kahn-Freund argues that using foreign law 
as a model for local law “becomes an abuse only if it is informed by a legalistic spirit 
which ignores this context of the law”.19 For him, it is expedient to consider “how far” 
the legal rule to be imported “owes its existence or its continued existence to a 
distribution of power” in its home jurisdiction which the importing jurisdiction does not 
share.20 Legrand, however, believes that for a legal transplant to be successful, the 
transplanted rule must function in exactly the same way in the importing jurisdiction as 
in the exporting jurisdiction; since this is not possible due to cultural and legal 
infrastructural differences, legal transplant is impossible.21  
14 Watson A Legal transplants, 2 ed (Athens GA: University of Georgia Press 1993) 21. 
15 Watson (1993) 95. 
16 Watson (1993) 97. 
17 Legrand P “The impossibility of ‘legal transplants’” (1997) 4 MJECL 114. 
18 Ewald W “Comparative jurisprudence (II): The logic of legal transplants” (1995) 43 AJCL 491–492. 
19 Kahn-Freund O “On uses and misuses of comparative law” (1974) 37 MLR 27. 
20 Kahn-Freund (1974) 12. 
21 Legrand (1997) 115–117. 
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Under Watson’s theory, it is only a question of whether the transplanted rule “functions 
in a manner that is socially useful in the recipient country”.22 His theory thus suggests 
that it is possible to transfer Alberta’s governance regime for oil sands development to 
Sub-Saharan Africa regardless of any institutional, sociological, political and other 
differences that may exist between Alberta and Sub-Saharan Africa. On the other hand, 
Kahn-Freund’s theory compels us to ask how far the Alberta governance regime for oil 
sands development owes its existence or continued existence to Alberta which Sub-
Saharan Africa does not share. Apparently, while knowledge of the socio-political 
context in the foreign jurisdiction is unimportant to Watson, it is important to Kahn-
Freund.  
Today, the dominant view recognizes the occurrence – nay, prevalence – of legal 
transplants, but acknowledges that there is not a one-size-fits-all approach to legal 
transplants. Most modern views acknowledge that “the adopting legal system will likely 
interpret, apply, and enforce transplanted rules differently”.23 It is a question of 
identifying the conditions for a successful transplant. Although scholars have 
considered the matter differently, the bottom line is that the more the two jurisdictions 
have in common the more successful a transplant is likely to be.24 Much depends, 
however, on “the intended purpose of the transplant” and how well the imported law is 
adapted to local conditions.25 
There are grounds to believe that a successful transplant of the governance 
regime for oil sands development in Alberta into Sub-Saharan Africa is possible. First, 
Alberta is by far the most experienced jurisdiction in the world in terms of oil sands 
development – in fact, it is the only jurisdiction with substantial oil sands experience – 
which makes it appropriate to say that its governance regime should at least be 
considered regardless of any differences that may exist between Alberta and Sub-
Saharan Africa. Certainly, there are critical differences. Alberta is a province in a 
federation whereas each of the Sub-Saharan African jurisdictions with oil sands 
deposits is a country. Naturally, the institutional arrangements in Alberta would be 
influenced by the political arrangement of Canada as a federation. The regulatory and 
governance structures function within this political arrangement, which may not 
necessarily be shared by Sub-Saharan African countries. However, the environmental 
impacts of oil sands development are likely to be generally comparable across 
jurisdictions. Moreover, as Odumosu has argued in the context of the transferability of 
Alberta’s gas flaring reduction framework to Nigeria, even if Alberta’s regulatory and 
governance structures are not transferable to Sub-Saharan Africa, Sub-Saharan Africa 
can learn from the experience of Alberta, even if only learning of the types of problems 
that arise in oil sands development, the mechanisms that Alberta has utilized to tackle 
them, the reasons they are utilizing those mechanisms, and how those mechanisms are 
22 Bitas BC “Comparative theory, judges and legal transplants: a practical lesson from Singapore and its 
relevance to transnational convergence” (2014) 26 SALJ 53. 
23 Morin J-F & Gold ER “An integrated model of legal transplantation: the diffusion of intellectual property law 
in developing countries” (2014) 58 ISQ 782. 
24 Odumosu IT “Transferring Alberta’s gas flaring reduction regulatory framework to Nigeria: potentials and 
limitations” (2007) 44 ALR 872. 
25 Odumosu (2007) 872. 
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working.26 The fact that Sub-Saharan African countries with oil sands deposits are still 
at very early stages in their exploitation of the resources, combined with the strong 
opposition to oil sands development by environmental activists, makes looking to 
jurisdictions like Alberta both prudent and expedient. A study such as this can therefore 
not “be an exercise in futility for, if nothing else, [Sub-Saharan Africa] would have 
acquired added information on mechanisms that could work within its system and 
those that simply cannot be incorporated”.27 
It must be pointed out that each of the Sub-Saharan African countries with oil 
sands deposits has its own socio-political history which can be more or less similar to 
Alberta’s. Nigeria, for instance, operates a federal system of government with a 
constitutional allocation of regulatory powers between the national and subnational 
governments. Angola, Madagascar and the Republic of Congo, however, operate unitary 
systems of government. This suggests that Nigeria likely has the closest similarity to 
Alberta and, therefore, it would be relatively easier for it than the other three countries 
to transplant the Alberta governance regime. As noted, however, much depends on the 
purpose of a legal transplant and how well a jurisdiction is able and ready to adapt the 
transplanted law to its own local conditions. 
3 THE GOVERNANCE ARCHITECTURE FOR OIL SANDS DEVELOPMENT IN 
ALBERTA  
The regulation of oil sands development in Alberta is governed mainly by a combination 
of federal and provincial laws and regulations in accordance with the Constitution Act 
1867, which provides for “heads of power” allocated between the federal and the 
provincial governments. However, there is considerable overlap between the powers 
allocated to both levels of government, resulting in both levels having conflicting 
authority over some matters. Canadian courts resolve such conflicts by either (1) 
examining the “pith and substance” of the law to determine where enacting authority 
over the subject matter resides;28 or (2) determining that enacting authority is shared 
and, applying the “double aspect” doctrine, holding that both levels of government have 
authority over certain aspects of the matter, provided the doctrine of paramountcy will 
apply in favour of federal law where there is a conflict.29 However, the federal 
government is conferred with jurisdiction over residual matters where the Constitution 
provides neither exclusive nor shared jurisdiction over the subject matter.30  
International and interprovincial matters are generally under federal jurisdiction 
while matters considered local to a province are under provincial jurisdiction.31 
Authority in respect of exploration for, and conservation and management of, non-
renewable natural resources resides with the province where the resources are 
26 Odumosu (2007) 872. 
27 Odumosu (2007) 872. 
28 Canadian Western Bank v Alberta [2007] 2 SCR 3. 
29 Reference re Securities Act [2011] 3SCR 873; Rothmans, Benson & Hedges Inc v Saskatchewan [2005] 1 
SCR 188. 
30 Constitution Act, 1867 s 91 (the “peace, order and good government” clause). 
31 Constitution Act, 1867 s 19(13). 
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located.32 Apparently, ownership and disposition of oil sands falls squarely under this 
head of power. This does not mean, however, that the federal government has nothing 
to do with oil sands development taking place in Alberta. Section 91(24) of the 
Constitution Act, 1867 gives the federal parliament authority over matters relating to 
“Indians, and lands reserved for Indians”, under which head of power the federal 
government can get involved in decisions regarding whether oil sands projects in 
Alberta that affect Aboriginal interests can proceed and under what conditions.  
However, the constitutional allocation of power is not exhaustive. One area of 
responsibility which is not allocated to any level of government is environmental 
protection. The Canadian Supreme Court has, however, held that environmental 
regulatory authority is shared by both federal and provincial governments provided 
each level of government’s exercise of power is related to a head of power clearly 
assigned to it under the Constitution Act, 1867.33 Several heads of power have been 
identified as allowing federal involvement in environmental protection. They include 
federal criminal law power under section 91(27) of the Constitution Act, 1867, the 
federal coast and inland fisheries power under section 91, and the peace, order and 
good government clause.34 These powers have enabled the federal government to get 
involved in regulating the environmental aspects of oil sands development in Alberta.  
Furthermore, there is a third level of governance in oil sands development in 
Alberta: the municipal (or local) governments. Although little attention has been paid to 
their role in oil and gas decision-making in Alberta, municipal governments are 
assuming increasing visibility. Their visibility is driven by provincial acknowledgement 
that many of the negative impacts of oil and gas development are borne mostly at the 
municipal level – by landowners and other land users.35 As the level of government 
“closest to the citizens affected and thus most responsive to their needs, to local 
distinctiveness, and to population diversity”,36 municipal governments “are often on the 
frontlines in dealing with landowner discontent”.37  
A municipality is a creature of the provincial legislature and is defined under the 
Municipal Government Act (MGA)38 as “a city, town, village, summer village, municipal 
district or specialized municipality”. A municipality is used synonymously with “local 
authority” and “local government”.39 A municipality has the power to enact bylaws to 
regulate a variety of matters within its territory, including matters affecting public 
health and safety, the protection of property, business activities within the territory, 
public utilities, the use and development of private and municipal lands, and (in some 
cases) public lands.40 Although municipal bylaws are not binding on the provincial 
Crown, where Crown land is leased to a private person, say, for oil and gas purposes, the 
32 Constitution Act, 1867 s 92A(1). 
33 Friends of the Oldman River Society v Canada (Minister of Transport) [1992] 1 SCR 3; R v Crown 
Zellerbach Canada Ltd [1988] 1 SCR 401. 
34 See Hogg PW “Constitutional authority over greenhouse gas emissions” (2009) 46(2) ALR 511. 
35 Vlavianos N & Thompson C “Alberta’s approach to local governance in oil and gas development” (2010) 
48:1 ALR 65–57. 
36 114957 Canada Ltée (Sraytech Société d’arrosage) v Hudson (Town of) [2002] 2 SCR 241 para 3. 
37 Vlavianos & Thompson (2010) 57. 
38 RSA 2000 c M-26 s 1(1).  
39 MGA s 1(1). 
40 MGA s 7 & Part 17. 
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MGA will apply to that private person except where the Crown claims immunity either 
under the lease or by some other means.41 
The authority of municipalities to regulate oil and gas development taking place 
on their territory is, however, very limited and is based on their power to control the 
use and development of certain land within their territory. For instance, an operator 
must notify an affected municipal authority before it can carry out a seismic exploration 
on municipal land and before the operator can apply to the Alberta Energy Regulator 
(AER) for a licence.42 Also, municipalities have the authority to protect “the public 
within its area of jurisdiction” in the context of oil and gas development through a 
declaration of a state of emergency within their territory pursuant to Alberta’s 
Emergency Management Act, except where the provincial “Government assumes 
direction and control”.43  
In spite of their limited authority, municipalities are proactive in letting their 
voice be heard during oil and gas project approval processes by filing applications 
asking that projects be suspended or delayed to allow time for municipalities to “catch 
up” to address the projects’ adverse socio-environmental impacts.44 Several 
municipalities have developed protocols with which oil and gas operators are to comply 
– protocols dealing with wildlife protection, land reclamation, noise pollution, 
emergency preparedness, etc, and protocols providing additional public notification and 
consultation requirements for oil and gas operators.45 In 2008 one municipality enacted 
a bylaw requiring its review and approval of emergency response plans for industrial 
activities.46 However, when provincial agencies raised questions about potential 
overlap with provincial regulations, the municipality rescinded the bylaw as a measure 
of “good faith and commitment by all parties to go forward and improve existing 
processes to address the County’s concerns”.47 Thus, even though municipalities do not 
have explicit and direct authority to regulate oil and gas development in Alberta, their 
proactive approach to protect the welfare of their residents influences how oil and gas 
development is governed in the province. At the minimum, it promotes a culture of 
41 Laux FA Planning law and practice in Alberta, 3 ed (Edmonton: Juriliber 2005) §§ 4.1(5)(b)–(c). 
42 Alberta Environment and Parks, Exploration Directive 2006-06: Application for Exploration Approval 
(2006). Available at http://aep.alberta.ca/forms-maps-services/directives/documents/ED-
ApplicationExplorationApproval-Dec01-2013.pdf (accessed 20 July 2017).  Strathcona County, The Strathcona 
County Protocol for Seismic Surveying, Drilling, Construction and Operation of Oil and Gas Facilities in 
Strathcona County, Revised: January 2017, Appendix 2 at 24. Available at 
http://www.strathcona.ca/files/files/at-pds-strathcoprotocol2017.pdf (accessed 12 July 2017). See, also, Kenyon 
D & Way N Landowner’s guide to oil and gas development 3 ed (Calgary: Pembina Institute 2016) 3–17. 
Available at https://www.pembina.org/reports/landowners-guide-2016.pdf (accessed 12 July 2017). 
43 Emergency Management Act RSA 2000 Cap E-6.8 s 11; Canadian 88 Energy Corp: Application to Drill a 
Level 4 Critical Sour Gas Well in the Lochend Field, Decision Summary, EUB Decision 99-16 7 July 1999 14. 
Available at https://www.aer.ca/documents/decisions/1999/d99-16.pdf (accessed 12 July 2017). 
44  See, e.g., Imperial Oil Resources Ventures Ltd: Application for an Oil Sands Mine and Bitumen Processing 
Facility (Kearl Oil Sands Project) in the Fort McMurray Area, Joint Panel Report, EUB Decision 2007-013 (27 
February 2007). See, also, Vlavianos & Thompson (2010) 7. 
45 See, eg, Strathcona County (2017).  
46 Parkland County, Bylaw No 60-2008, Industrial Activity Emergency Response Plan Review and Approval 
Bylaw (9 December 2008). 
47 Parkland County, Bylaw No 27-2009, a bylaw to rescind the Industrial Activity Emergency Response Plan 
Review and Approval Bylaw 60-2008 (6 June 2009). 
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inter-governmental consultation on how oil and gas projects are to be carried out, 
which in turn promotes an integrated approach to provincial growth. 
In sum, the governance architecture for oil sands development in Alberta 
consists of three levels: the federal, provincial, and municipal levels. The heart of 
governance activity is the provincial level where most of the regulatory decisions are 
made. Whether the federal government would be involved in the regulation of oil sands 
development in Alberta depends on the specific location of the project and/or on the 
scope of the project’s environmental impacts.  
4 ALBERTA’S SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT STRATEGY FOR THE OIL SANDS 
As famously defined by the World Commission on Environment and Development 
(WCED), sustainable development is “development that meets the needs of the present 
without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs”.48 
Accordingly, in the pursuit of economic development, there is need to confine 
development activities to the “carrying capacity” of the earth and to manage natural 
resources in a manner that serves both current demand and the needs of future 
generations.49 At the heart of the concept, therefore, are ideas of intra-generational 
equity and intergenerational equity. Intra-generational equity relates to development 
and is a pre-condition for its achievement, while intergenerational equity relates to 
sustainability and is a pre-condition for its achievement.50 Scholarly engagement with 
the concept has led to multiple interpretations of it, the most popular being the 
identification of three core components of the concept (otherwise known as the triple 
bottom line): the economic component, the environmental component and the social 
component.51 This means that for development to be considered sustainable, it must 
contribute positively to the surrounding economic system, must allow the preservation 
of the natural environment for future generations, and must contribute positively to the 
surrounding social system, ie, to the development of the community where the 
development takes place.52  
Despite the above basic idea of sustainable development there is seemingly 
unending debate about how to advance sustainability. An important by-product of this 
debate is an increase in cross-disciplinary communication especially between scientists 
and social scientists, with attendant shifts in the research methods utilized to 
understand sustainability issues. The concept of “socio-ecological systems” (SES) is, for 
48 World Commission on Environment and Development (WCED) Report of the World Commission on 
Environment and Development: our common future (1987) 43. Available at www.un-documents.net/our-
common-future.pdf (accessed 12 July 2017).  
49 IUCN/UNEP/WWF Caring for the earth: A strategy for sustainable living (Gland (Switzerland): 
IUCN/UNEP/WWF 1991) 10. Available at https://portals.iucn.org/library/efiles/documents/CFE-003.pdf 
(accessed 12 July 2017). 
50 George C “Testing for sustainable development through environmental assessment” (1999) 19(2) EIAR 178. 
51 Elkington J Cannibals with forks: the triple bottom line of 21st century business (Capstone 1998); Barkemeyer 
R et al “What happened to the ‘development’ in sustainable development? Business guidelines two decades after 
Brundtland’ (2014) 22(1) Sustainable Development 17. 
52 See Alhaddi H “Triple bottom line and sustainability: a literature review” (2015) 1:2 Business & Management 
Studies 8; Jackson A et al “Sustainability and triple bottom line reporting – what is it all about?” (2011) 1(3) 
IJBHT 58. 
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instance, being explored to understand and explain the drivers of change in our 
ecosystem.53 Building on the ideas of Elinor Ostrom, SES scholars explore the complex 
interaction between science and society. The goal is to find solutions to the 
sustainability crisis in the age of the Anthropocene, i.e., the time during which human 
activities so outpace geophysical processes that “[h]umanity itself has become a global 
geophysical force”.54 Governance systems addressing sustainability could also be built 
around this cross-disciplinary communication to identify what actions should be taken, 
and to establish mechanisms to ensure that those actions are taken by those charged 
with them. This requires the articulation of a clear sustainable development strategy 
and action plan to pursue it. 
Alberta’s Provincial Energy Strategy recognizes that together with conventional 
energy resources, renewable and alternative energy resources will play an increasing 
role in guaranteeing Alberta’s energy future and that the oil sands will play a significant 
role in transforming Alberta’s economy and in meeting global energy demand .55 
Alberta’s sustainable development strategy for the development of its oil sands is 
articulated in Responsible Actions: A Plan for Alberta’s Oil Sands.56 The government’s 
vision for the oil sands, which is that “development occurs responsibly, sustains growth 
for industry and the province over the long term, and is done in a manner that enhances 
Albertans’ quality of life”,57 is the foundation for this strategic plan. The plan was 
informed by four core principles: (1) healthy environment and communities; (2) 
balanced growth; (3) collaboration; and (4) public interest and accountability.58 Its 
projected outcomes are optimized economic growth, reduced environmental footprint, 
and increased quality of life for present and future generations of Albertans.59  
The plan identifies six strategies: (1) develop the oil sands in an environmentally 
responsible manner; (2) nurture healthy communities and a quality of life in Alberta 
that attract and retain people and businesses; (3) maximize the long-term value of oil 
sands development for all Albertans; (4) strengthen the government’s relationship with 
Aboriginal peoples, through appropriate consultations, to reconcile divergent interests; 
(5) increase investments in research and innovation to improve access to oil sands 
deposits, reduce development costs and minimize environmental impacts; and (6) 
address challenges in communicating information about oil sands development to the 
53 See Hall DM “Social-ecological system resonance: a theoretical framework for brokering sustainable 
solutions” (2017) 12(3) Sustainability Science 381–392; Partelow S “Coevolving Ostrom’s social–ecological 
systems (SES) framework and sustainability science: four key co-benefits” (2015) 11(3) Sustainability Science 
DOI: 10.1007/s11625-015-0351-3; Steffen W et al “The anthropocene: from global change to planetary 
stewardship (2011) 40(7) Ambio 739–761. 
54 Steffen (2011) 741. 
55 Government of Alberta, Launching Alberta’s Energy Future: The Provincial Strategy (December 2008). 
Available at https://open.alberta.ca/dataset/6f220382-b4ae-43f8-b3f9-7c1230e6700e/resource/e7c2f3d2-7e0d-
4774-a463-c54c5450a04e/download/4256197-2009-Launching-Albertas-Energy-Future-Provincial-Enregy-
Strategy-2009-08-27.pdf (accessed 12 July 2017).  
56 Government of Alberta, Responsible actions: a plan for Alberta’s oil sands (February 2009) 4. Available at 
http://www.energy.alberta.ca/pdf/OSSgoaResponsibleActions_web.pdf (accessed 12 July 2017). 
57 Government of Alberta (2009) 4. 
58 Government of Alberta (2009) 9. 
59 Government of Alberta (2009) 10. 
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public and in ensuring accountability in the management of the resources.60 There are 
four key success factors for the achievement of the strategies: (1) a “well-defined and 
stable regulatory” environment; (2) investments by governments and industry; (3) 
partnership among stakeholders and all governmental levels; and (4) research and 
technological innovation.61 
The Alberta government has already taken several significant steps to achieve its 
strategic plan. Those steps include the development of a gas flaring reduction 
framework,62 a Land-use Framework to manage the cumulative effects of oil sands 
development on each region of the province,63 a climate change strategy to meet 
Alberta’s GHG reduction goals,64 a Water for Life strategy to improve water 
management in Alberta,65 and an enhanced enforcement of environmental laws and 
regulations.66 Alberta’s gas flaring reduction framework, which uses a combination of 
regulatory and non-regulatory measures, is viewed by the World Bank as a global best 
practice model for gas flaring reduction and as “the most comprehensive and 
transparent gas flaring and venting regulatory regime”.67 Although public concern exists 
regarding the extent of gas flared in Alberta, scholars acknowledge that the province has 
significantly curbed gas flaring. 68 Between 2008 and 2012, for instance, nearly 96 per 
cent of all solution gas was conserved rather than flared or vented.69 
It is with the AER that responsibility for implementing the Alberta sustainable 
development strategy relating to the oil sands essentially rests. The agency seems to 
have shown a commitment to transparency and to continuous improvement through 
investments in research and development. Its annual reports show not only what 
progress it has made since its inception but also how it is working towards meeting its 
goals, where it has fallen short and what challenges are responsible for that, and what 
measures it intends to take to overcome those challenges in the future.70 Immediately 
after its establishment in 2013, it established a Core Research Centre, which provides 
60 Government of Alberta (2009) 16–38. 
61 Government of Alberta (2009) 40–41. 
62 Alberta Energy Regulator (AER) Directive 060: Upstream petroleum industry flaring, incinerating, and 
venting, (22 March 2016). Available at https://www.aer.ca/documents/directives/Directive060.pdf (accessed 13 
July 2017).  
63 Government of Alberta Land-use framework (2008). Available at 
https://landuse.alberta.ca/LandUse%20Documents/Land-use%20Framework%20-%202008-12.pdf (accessed 13 
July 2017).  
64 Government of Alberta Climate Leadership – Report to Minister (November 2015). Available at 
https://www.alberta.ca/documents/climate/climate-leadership-report-to-minister.pdf (accessed 13 July 2017). 
65 Government of Alberta Water for life: Alberta’s strategy for sustainability (November 2003). Available at 
http://aep.alberta.ca/water/programs-and-services/water-for-life/strategy/documents/WaterForLife-Strategy-
Nov2003.pdf (accessed 13 July 2017).  
66 See Nwapi (2013). 
67 World Bank Group Regulation of associated gas flaring and venting: a global overview and lessons from 
international experience, Report #3 5. Available at 
http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/590561468765565919/pdf/295540Regulati1aring0no10301public1.
pdf (accessed 13 July 2017). 
68 See eg, Odumosu (2007) 865; Orieji Onuma, “Mainstreaming sustainability: An evaluation of Alberta’s legal 
and regulatory regime for gas flaring” (2015) 116 Resources 8. 
69 Onuma (2015) 8. 
70 See eg, AER 2016/2017 Annual Report. Available at http://www1.aer.ca/annualreport/media/AER2016-
17AnnualReport.pdf (accessed 11 December 2017).  
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access to a variety of data and information about the energy industry, including drill 
cutting samples and daily well drilling reports.71 It has piloted a number of projects to 
test its regulatory models and has developed new rules, directives and industry 
performance programs to strengthen its regulatory effectiveness.72 The industry 
performance program establishes the standard for measuring and reporting on energy 
development activities. It is aimed at going beyond compliance to enhancing operator 
performance with a view to ensuring that energy development is carried out in a safe 
and responsible manner.73 In 2016, it achieved a 3 per cent reduction in energy pipeline 
incidents.74 In the same year, it established the International Centre of Regulatory 
Excellence – a not-for-profit institution – to help regulators around the world to train, 
collaborate and innovate to address regulatory challenges faced in the energy sector.75 
A 2017 survey showed that 82 per cent of Albertans and 77 per cent of stakeholders 
expressed confidence in its performance.76  
In sum, Alberta’s sustainable development strategy reflects a commitment to 
minimizing the socio-environmental impacts of economic development as well as 
maximizing the efficient use of natural resources. One of the strategy’s major strengths, 
however, is that it is specifically attuned to the development of the oil sands. One of its 
weaknesses, however, may be the absence of a legal framework establishing the 
strategy. This can be contrasted with the federal sustainable development strategy 
which is enacted under the Federal Sustainable Development Act (FSDA) under which 
the Canadian government “accepts the basic principle that sustainable development is 
based on an ecologically efficient use of natural, social and economic resources and 
acknowledges the need to integrate environmental, economic and social factors in the 
making of all decisions by government”.77 The Act establishes mechanisms for 
implementing the strategy and for monitoring progress.78 The value of a legal 
framework is that it raises the degree of importance attached to the strategy and gives a 
certain degree of assurance that the strategy will be followed through.  
5 KEY FEATURES OF ALBERTA’S GOVERNANCE REGIME FOR SUSTAINABLE 
OIL SANDS DEVELOPMENT  
Before considering the key features of the governance regime for oil sands development 
in Alberta, it is important to point out that oil sands development in Alberta is regulated 
by the Responsible Energy Development Act, 2012 (REDA),79 the same legislation that 
71 AER Core Research Centre. Available at https://www.aer.ca/about-aer/contact-us/core-research-centre 
(accessed 11 December 2017). 
72 AER 2016/2017 Annual Report 12. 
73 AER “Industry Performance Program”. Available at https://www.aer.ca/data-and-publications/industry-
performance-program (accessed 11 December 2017). 
74 AER 2016/2017 Annual Report 12. 
75 See International Centre of Regulatory Excellence Available at http://icoreglobal.ca/about-icore (accessed 11 
December 2017). 
76 AER 2016/2017 Annual Report  12. 
77 SC 2008 c 33 s 5. 
78 FSDA s 7(1). 
79 SA 2012 c R-17.3. 
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regulates conventional oil development. This contrasts with the situation in most 
countries where oil sands development is regulated by mining legislation. However, 
while oil sands development is generally governed by the same legislation governing 
conventional oil development in Alberta, there is also separate legislation governing 
certain aspects of oil sands development,80 indicating recognition by the Alberta 
government that even though oil sands development can be integrated into 
conventional oil regulation, oil sands development has unique features that warrant 
additional legislation. The discussion that follows analyses five key features of oil sands 
governance in Alberta: energy regulatory policy, EIAs, Aboriginal/public consultation, 
impact benefit agreements, and environmental enforcement.  
 
5.1. Energy Regulatory Policy in Alberta 
Energy regulators operate in an increasingly complex system where public and private 
interests clash and international competition gets stiffer due mainly to increasing 
energy demand and depleting conventional oil resources. Balancing the multiple 
interests while ensuring that a jurisdiction remains competitive in terms of attracting 
investments is essential for the sustainability of the jurisdiction’s energy industry. A 
Regulatory Enhancement Task Force established by the Alberta government in 2010 to 
seek stakeholder opinions regarding the existing regulatory regime identified a desire 
for a simplified, more transparent and accountable system that uses a single, consistent 
set of processes instead of different processes across different regulatory bodies.81 The 
task force also noted a desire by Albertans for clear public engagement processes that 
enable Albertans to participate effectively during the policy development stages of 
energy resources in the province.82 These findings led to a major shift in the energy 
regulatory system in Alberta through the enactment of the REDA in 2012.  
The REDA brought together already existing regulatory bodies (the Energy 
Resource Conservation Board and the Environment and Sustainable Resource 
Development) to form the AER, an independent agency established as a corporation 
(not an agent of the Crown), with quasi-judicial functions.83 The goal was to create a 
single energy regulator – a one-stop shop for energy regulation. This means that energy 
companies will deal with only one regulator – the AER – when proposing energy 
projects in Alberta.84 This allows for an integrated approach to energy regulation. AER’s 
authority is, however, limited to oil, bitumen, natural gas and coal, and does not extend 
to electricity generation and distribution, gasoline (or any other refined petroleum 
products) and oil and gas pipelines crossing provincial or international borders (which 
80 An example is the Oil Sands Conservation Act RSA 2000 c O-7, whose main objective is “to effect 
conservation and prevent waste of the oil sands resources of Alberta” (s 3(a)). 
81 Government of Alberta “Enhancing assurance: developing an integrated energy resource regulator”, A 
Discussion Document, May 2011 3. Available at 
http://www.energy.alberta.ca/Org/pdfs/REPEnhancingAssuranceIntegratedRegulator.pdf (accessed 28 June 
2017). 
82 Government of Alberta (2011) 4. 
83 REDA ss 3–4. 
84 AER Alberta Energy Regulator 2015/2016 annual report, Executive Summary, 1. Available at 
https://www.aer.ca/documents/reports/AER2015-16AnnualReportExecutiveSummary.pdf (accessed 28 June 
2017). 
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are regulator by a federal agency, the National Energy Board).85 As an independent 
quasi-judicial regulatory body, the AER exercises regulatory, approval, policy-making, 
adjudicatory and advisory functions and its decisions are appealable to the Alberta 
Court of Appeal.86 The AER aspires to become a “best-in-class regulator”87 and its idea 
of “regulatory excellence” is anchored in the framework for regulatory excellence 
developed by the renowned Penn Program on Regulation in the University of 
Pennsylvania Law School, which identifies the following tenets: fidelity to law, respect 
for democracy, commitment to public interest, even-handedness with all interests, 
listening to the interested public, responsiveness, analytical capability, instrumental 
capacity, and high performance.88 
The second key feature of regulatory policy in Alberta is the adoption of an 
“Area-Based Regulation” (ABR) approach, which establishes rules and practices that are 
“geographically-specific” to address the energy resources and unique environmental 
conditions in a defined area, in partnership with the community in that area.89 Before 
the adoption of ABR, the AER considered adopting a “Play-Based” Regulatory (PBR) 
system, which allows applications for multiple energy development activities, such as 
wells, pipelines, access roads and water use, to be submitted as one application rather 
than having a separate application for each activity.90 While all proposed activities will 
require one application, each activity will undergo a strict “technical review” of all its 
aspects.91 The move to ABR was driven by the AER’s deeper recognition of the scale and 
complexity of energy projects, a renewed emphasis on the cumulative effects of energy 
projects, and the increasing public expectations for involvement and participation in 
energy development decisions and the consequent need to build trust with Albertans.92 
There are three major components to the ABR: integrated area assessment, 
collaborative engagement, and the development of practices and requirements for 
undertaking energy development in defined areas.93 The ABR approach enables local 
conditions to be understood, shared and addressed, and that decisions are integrated to 
account for local conditions and cumulative impacts.  
Another key feature of the paradigm shift in energy resource policy in Alberta is 
regional planning. Regional planning is premised on the recognition that all industrial 
activities produce effects on Alberta’s environment. Regional planning therefore aims to 
85 AER (2015/2016) 1. 
86 REDA s 45. 
87 AER “The road to becoming best in class”, AER Focus, February 2016. Available at 
https://www.aer.ca/documents/atb/AERFocus_February2016.pdf (accessed 28 June 2017).  
88 Cary Coglianese Listening, learning, leading: A framework for regulatory excellence, Penn Program on 
Regulation, (2015) iii. Available at http://aer.ca/documents/about-
us/UPenn_Final_Report_Regulatory_Excellence.pdf (accessed 28 June 2017). 
89 AER Enabling the use of alternatives to high-quality non-saline water by the oil and gas sector in the MD 
Greenview – Recommendations to the Alberta Energy Regulator and Alberta Environment and Parks from the 
multi-stakeholder panel for the area-based regulation pilot project, 21 June 2017, 1. Available at 
http://aer.ca/documents/reports/AreaBasedRegulation_RecommendationReport.pdf (accessed 12 December 
2017).  
90 AER “Play-based regulation: piloting a new approach to oil and gas development”, January 2015 1.Available 
at https://www.aer.ca/documents/about-us/PBR_Brochure.PDF (accessed 28 June 2017).  
91 AER (2015) 2. 
92 AER (2017) 1. 
93 AER (2017) 1 
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create approval processes and standards that apply to an entire region as against 
piecemeal approval processes. An important aspect of this is the introduction of major 
changes to land use in Alberta through the creation of a framework to develop regional 
land use plans under the Alberta Land Stewardship Act, 2009 (ALSA).94 The REDA 
requires the AER to “act in accordance with … ALSA regional plans” and establishes 
administrative penalties for breach of a regional plan.95 Each regional plan will set the 
context for all land use decision-making in a region and will have the force of law after 
the plan is approved and gazetted by the government, such that any regulations, 
municipal bylaws, government policies and codes of practice inconsistent with the plan 
are void.96 The first land use plan (called the Lower Athabasca Regional Plan, which 
covers the area in which the oil sands are located) was developed in 2012 following 
years of consultation with residents of the area and experts regarding the socio-
economic and environmental impacts of the plan.97  
In sum, energy regulation in Alberta is characterized by three key policies: the 
creation of a single energy regulator, an “Area-Based” system of regulation, and regional 
planning. Two key ingredients are remarkable about Alberta’s energy policy: (1) the 
recognition of the importance of mustering local support for energy projects and (2) the 
involvement of the public in the very process of formulating the policies. The 
independent agency approach to regulation has been a “permanent feature” of oil and 
gas regulation in Alberta for a long time.98 By separating the regulator from the political 
organs of government, the Alberta government seeks to ensure that approval decisions 
are not subject to political biases but based on an objective assessment of project 
proposals and the views of the affected public.  
 
5.2. Environmental Impact Assessments (EIAs) 
A key feature of the governance regime for achieving sustainable oil sands development 
in Alberta is the requirement that oil sands projects be preceded by an assessment of 
their environmental impacts. An EIA is “the process of identifying, predicting, evaluating 
and mitigating the biophysical, social, and other relevant effects of development 
proposals prior to major decisions being taken and commitments made”.99 Since the 
federal and provincial governments in Canada both share environmental protection 
authority, the EIA process for oil sands projects in Alberta is regulated by both federal 
and provincial laws. Federal involvement is required whenever a federal authority: (1) 
proposes a project; (2) provides financial assistance for a project; (3) transfers control 
of federal lands to enable a project to be undertaken; (4) exercises a regulatory 
authority(such as providing a permit, licence or approval) specified in the Law List 
94 SA 2009 c A-26.8.  
95 REDA ss 20 and 70. 
96 Ingelson A & Nwapi C “Planning for the future: the development of new corridors for energy infrastructure in 
Alberta, Canada” (2014) 1(2) UPES L Rev 191–192. 
97 Government of Alberta Lower Athabasca regional plan 2012–2022. Available at 
https://landuse.alberta.ca/LandUse%20Documents/Lower%20Athabasca%20Regional%20Plan%202012-
2022%20Approved%202012-08.pdf (accessed 28 June 2017).  
98 Odumosu (2007) 878. 
99 IAIA/Institute of Environmental Assessment “Principles of environmental impact assessment best practice” 
(January 1999) 2. Available at https://www.iaia.org/uploads/pdf/principlesEA_1.pdf (accessed 18 July 2017).  
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Regulations, SOR/94-636 that enables a project to be carried out; or (5) if a project has 
trans-boundary or international effects.100 Since my focus is on the governance regime 
in Alberta, however – and due also to space constraints – I will focus on the EIA regime 
in Alberta and will introduce the federal process only to explain how overlaps between 
it and the provincial process can affect the operation of the EIA process in Alberta. 
 In Alberta, the principal EIA statute is the Environmental Protection and 
Enhancement Act, 2000 (EPEA)101 and its accompanying regulations102 and 
guidelines.103 One of the key features of the EPEA is the adoption of a project-list 
approach to the determination of whether an EIA would be carried out.104 This 
approach establishes three categories of projects relating to EIAs: a mandatory list 
(under which an EIA must be carried out); a discretionary list (under which the Director 
decides whether an EIA is required ) and an exempt list (containing projects exempted 
from EIAs). Rather than analysing the substantive elements of the EIA process in 
Alberta, it is more useful for the purposes of this article to focus on current debates on 
the EIA process. Current debates centre mainly around the adequacy of opportunities 
for public participation, how to address overlaps between federal and provincial 
jurisdiction, the development of monitoring programs as part of the EIA process 
(especially for oil sands projects), and the consideration of cumulative effects. Public 
participation and inter-jurisdictional overlaps are more concerned than the last two 
issues with the legal structures of the EIA process and therefore will be my focus. 
Moreover, to avoid duplicating the discussion more appropriately reserved for the 
section on Aboriginal consultation, I will deal with public participation here very briefly.  
Opportunities for public participation promote a “deliberative and collaborative 
approach to planning” and highlight “the importance of communication as a means of 
negotiating consensus solutions that capture the values of those participants,” by 
bringing stakeholders into decision-making processes.105 There is a range of publics 
entitled to participate in decisions concerning oil sands development: Aboriginal 
peoples (whose participatory rights are traced to the Constitution), landowners, local 
citizens who meet statutory standing requirements, and Non-Governmental 
Organisations (NGOs) that meet “public-interest discretionary standing” 
requirements.106 To support full and effective participation of citizens, the Alberta 
government has established participant funding schemes for financially challenged 
100 Environmental Law Centre “Fact sheet: Environmental assessments” (2007) 2–3. Available at 
http://elc.ab.ca/Content_Files/Files/EnvironmentalAssessments.pdf (accessed 18 July 2017). 
101 RSA 2000 c E-12 [EPEA]. 
102 Environmental Assessment (Mandatory and Exempted Activities) Regulation Alta. Reg. 111/93. 
103 The Government of Alberta’s Guidelines on Consultations with First Nations on Land and Natural Resource 
Management, 28 July 2014. Available at 
http://indigenous.alberta.ca/documents/First_Nations_Consultation_Guidelines_LNRD.pdf (accessed 18 July 
2017). 
104 See Regulations Designating Physical Activities SOR/2012-147 6 July 2012. 
105 Wanvik (2016) 522. 
106 Lucas A “Canadian participatory rights in mining and energy resource development: the bridges to 
empowerment?” in Zillman D Lucas A & Pring G-R (eds) Human rights in natural resource development: 
public participation in the sustainable development of mining and energy resources (New York: Oxford 
University Press 2002) 307–308. 
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affected publics.107 Such schemes enhance the public’s access to justice and promote the 
acceptability of decisions.  
Overlap and divergence between federal and provincial EIA processes 
sometimes lead to duplication, inter-jurisdictional conflicts, and litigation, which in turn 
produce costly and time-consuming project approval processes.108 The classical 
Canadian approach to resolving interjurisdictional conflicts is founded on the principle 
of “cooperative federalism”.109 The co-operation techniques employed include the 
creation of federal-provincial agreements, the use of joint assessment panels, and 
delegation. While a joint panel allows the federal and provincial governments to co-
ordinate the EIA process jointly, delegation allows one government to delegate the 
authority to carry out the assessment to the other government.110 The federal 
government’s current attitude is to promote investment through expediting project 
approval processes,111 even if it means reducing federal involvement in EIA processes. 
This is achieved through the adoption of two principles: substitution and equivalency. 
 Substitution occurs when an EIA process, or an aspect thereof (such as public 
hearings), is replaced by another EIA process.112 Schematically, it occurs “where a law 
or process of one jurisdiction or agency ‘A’ is substituted for a law or process of 
jurisdiction or agency ‘B’ such that the application of A’s law or process is deemed to be 
an application of B’s law or process”.113 Substitution thus allows one regime’s process to 
replace another regime’s process. Section 32(1) of CEAA 2012 allows for substitution of 
provincial processes for federal processes if the Minister considers a provincial process 
“an appropriate substitute”.114 The Minister, however, shall act only upon a request for 
substitution by a province.115 
Equivalency occurs where the two legal regimes are deemed equivalent (ie, alike 
or comparable) to each other. The difference between substitution and equivalency is 
that under substitution, the application of the substituting law is deemed the 
application of the substituted law whereas no such deeming takes place under 
equivalency.116 Moreover, there is no need, under substitution, for the two regimes or 
processes to be equivalent to each other.117 Where the provincial process is considered 
by the federal Minister to be equivalent to the federal process, the federal process will 
107 Aboriginal Consultation Levy Act 2013 c A-1.2 s 4. 
108 Hickey GM, Brunet N & Allan N “A constant comparison of the environmental assessment legislation in 
Canada” (2010) 12(3) JEPP 316.  
109 MiningWatch Canada v Canada (Fisheries and Oceans), [2010] 1 SCR 6 paras 24 & 25. 
110 See Canadian Environmental Assessment Act 2012 (CEAA) ss 26(1) & 40. 
111 Ingelson I “The new Canadian Environmental Assessment Act”, Paper presented at the 2013 International 
Association for Impact Assessment (IAIA) Conference, “Impact assessment: the Next Generation”, Calgary, 
Canada, 13–16 May 2013 2. Available at 
http://conferences.iaia.org/2013/pdf/Final%20papers%20review%20process%2013/The%20New%20Canadian
%20Environmental%20Assessment%20Act.pdf (accessed 18 July 2017).  
112 Sinclair AJ, Schneider G & Mitchell L “Environmental impact assessment process substitution: experiences 
of public participants” (2012) 30(2) IAPA 85. 
113 Kwasniak A “Environmental assessment, overlap, duplication, harmonization, equivalency, and substitution: 
Interpretation, misinterpretation, and a path forward” (2009) 20(1) JELP 72. 
114 CEAA 2012 s 32(1). 
115 CEAA 2012 s 32(1). 
116 Kwasniak (2009) 72. 
117 Kwasniak (2009) 72. 
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not apply, whereas it does to an extent under substitution in that the Minister remains 
responsible for determining the likelihood of significant adverse environmental effects, 
using the EIA report prepared by the substituting provincial jurisdiction.118 
Many Canadian commentators believe that the federal process is more stringent 
than the Alberta process and that substitution and equivalency would promote a 
situation whereby only the Alberta process would apply, thus resulting in the 
application of a less stringent process.119 The problem with substitution and 
equivalency is that they seem to ignore the divergent mandates and areas of interest of 
different jurisdictional authorities.120 Provincial environmental and economic interests 
will, for instance, not always correspond to federal ones. Determining whether it is 
appropriate to substitute a provincial EIA process for a federal one where such a 
divergence exists would be difficult and may undermine the effectiveness of the 
process.121 Such divergences may prove significant for the outcome of the substitution 
or equivalency process and may lead to a lowering of standards. 
 
5.3. Duty to Consult Aboriginal Peoples 
One of the most significant developments in energy regulation in Canada over the past 
decade is arguably the evolution of the duty to consult Aboriginal people in energy 
development. The duty to consult is founded on the Crown’s fiduciary relationship with 
Aboriginal people and in “the honour of the Crown” which arises “from the Crown’s 
assertion of sovereignty over an Aboriginal people and de facto control of land and 
resources that were formerly in the control of that people”.122 The assertion of 
sovereignty gives rise to “an obligation to treat aboriginal peoples fairly and 
honourably, and to protect them from exploitation.”123 The duty is also linked to the 
rights enshrined in section 35 of the Constitution Act, 1982, which recognizes and 
affirms “the existing aboriginal and treaty rights of aboriginal people in Canada”.124 The 
principal purpose of the duty is “to advance the objective of reconciliation of pre-
existing Aboriginal societies with the assertion of Crown sovereignty”.125 Its substantive 
component is “the duty to accommodate”, ie, to “seriously consider” and “demonstrably 
integrate” Aboriginal concerns into a proposed decision or plan of action that may 
impact on Aboriginal rights or titles.126 The duty is triggered “when the Crown has 
knowledge, real or constructive, of the potential existence of the Aboriginal right or title 
and contemplates conduct that might adversely affect it”.127 The basic test to be satisfied 
118 CEAA 2012 s 37(1).  
119 See eg, Kwasniak (2009) 72. 
120 Fitzpatrick P & Sinclair AJ “Multi-jurisdictional environmental impact assessment: Canadian experiences” 
(2009) 29 EIAR 258. 
121 Sinclair, Schneider & Mitchell (2012) 87–91 have highlighted the divergence of approach to hearing 
proceedings by different regulatory bodies during EIAs. 
122 Haida Nation v British Columbia (Minister of Forests) [2004] 3 SCR 511 para 32. 
123 Mitchell v MNR [2001] 1 SCR 911 para. 9. 
124 Behn v Moulton Contracting Company 2013 SCC 26 para 26. 
125 Laidlaw D & Passelac-Ross M Alberta First Nations consultation and accommodation handbook, CIRL 
Occasional Paper #44 (March 2014) 4. Available at 
http://www.cirl.ca/files/cirl/consultationhandbookop44w.pdf (accessed 18 July 2017).  
126 Mikisew Cree First Nation v Canada (Minister of Canadian Heritage) [2005] 3 SCR 388 para 64. 
127 Haida para 35. 
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is whether Aboriginal interests would be infringed upon. Once this test is met, the AER 
must carry out Aboriginal consultation. 
The Canadian Supreme Court has made it clear time and again that the duty to 
consult Aboriginal peoples applies not only where regulatory decision-making may 
affect a recognized or existing Aboriginal right, but also where the affected right is 
merely inchoate in the sense of having not yet been recognized.128 Those rights are 
“collective” in nature.129 However, an Aboriginal group can “authorize” a person to 
assert those rights on its behalf. In the absence of such an authorization an energy 
regulator must identify the affected Aboriginal group for the purpose of engaging in 
consultation. Given that identifying the affected Aboriginal people may be complicated 
where there are overlapping or disputed rights and claims between two or more 
Aboriginal peoples, regulators are encouraged to develop detailed policies and 
methodologies for consultation with Aboriginal peoples.130 Regulators are also 
encouraged to recognize that the duty to consult may not be fulfilled by merely granting 
affected Aboriginal peoples equal access to participate at any required hearings as is 
granted to non-Aboriginal parties, and that “individualized and specially tailored forms 
of consultation” may be required for Aboriginal peoples.131  
To the above ends the Alberta government has developed guidelines to “clarify 
the expectations of all parties engaged in consultation”, to establish procedures to be 
followed in the consultation process, and to demonstrate how the Alberta government 
intends to fulfil its duty to consult Aboriginal peoples.132 The duty to carry out the 
procedural aspects of the consultation is in most cases delegated to project proponents 
– usually private companies.133 Studies show that this delegation is preferred by local 
stakeholders who would rather negotiate with companies than with governments due 
to a historical distrust they have for governments.134 This delegation of consultation 
responsibility is part of the governance innovation that grants an increased role to the 
private sector. The development of Alberta’s Aboriginal consultation guidelines has, 
however, been criticized for involving very minimal engagement with Aboriginal 
peoples.135 While policy documents are not legislation, they do influence judicial 
interpretation of existing legislation. 
Although the duty to consult Aboriginal peoples before development projects 
affecting them are undertaken does not give Aboriginal peoples the power to veto 
projects,136 Aboriginal organizations are a powerful force in oil sands development in 
Alberta. Their discontent with any proposed project can lead to lengthy litigation that 
128 Delgamuukw v British Columbia [1997] 3 SCR 1010 para 168. 
129 Haida 62. 
130 Mullan DJ “Regulators and the courts: a ten year perspective” (2013) 1 Energy Regulation Quarterly 41.  
131 Mullan (2013) 41. 
132 Government of Alberta” The Government of Alberta’s Policy on Consultation with First Nations on Land 
and Natural Resources Management”, 28 July 2014 1. Available at 
http://indigenous.alberta.ca/documents/First_Nations_Consultation_Guidelines_LNRD.pdf (accessed 24 July 
2017).  
133 Government of Alberta (2014) 6.  
134 Wanvik (2016) 521. 
135 Laidlaw & Passelac-Ross (2014) 21–23. 
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can significantly delay the take-off of projects, if not stop them altogether.137 They have 
utilized their constitutionalized rights to redesign the legal landscape for energy 
development in Alberta and across Canada and gain some measure of control over what 
takes place on their traditional lands through a long series of judicial victories. 
Governments and the private sector are forced to find ways to adapt to the new legal 
realities created by each judicial victory. To enhance their capacity to consult with 
Aboriginal people and avoid disruptions with their projects most oil and gas companies 
in Alberta have established Aboriginal relations departments staffed by highly trained 
personnel to address Aboriginal issues and to monitor and track new legal and policy 
developments affecting Aboriginal people. Many have developed their own best-
practice practical guidelines for working with Aboriginal communities. The impact of 
these developments on Aboriginal people has been government and private sector 
support for Aboriginal entrepreneurship, job creation and other business opportunities 
for members of Aboriginal communities.138 These are established through impact-
benefit agreements between Aboriginal communities and companies. 
A major challenge to the implementation of the duty to consult in Alberta (and 
across Canada) is the achievement of what can be regarded as “meaningful 
consultation” – a term that defies definition – with a view to improving the relationship 
between the Alberta government and Aboriginal peoples. For the AER, which carries out 
the consultation process, the bottom line is to understand the varied ways that 
Aboriginal cultures and western cultures look at issues surrounding energy 
development and to see how the two world views can cohabit. While this remains 
difficult to achieve, there is evidence that progress has been made towards finding a 
connection between two different knowledge systems, which enables the AER to 
approach decision-making discussions with an improved understanding of how to 
create ethical spaces for the knowledge systems to thrive.139 
 
5.4. Impact Benefit Agreements (IBAs) 
IBAs are agreements made between Aboriginal communities and companies to establish 
a formal relationship between them to reduce the potential impacts of oil sands 
operations and to secure socio-economic benefits for the Aboriginal communities.140 
Provisions that could be negotiated in IBAs commonly include: recognition of Aboriginal 
rights; payments to Aboriginal communities, opportunities for employment and training 
of members of Aboriginal communities, opportunities for economic development of 
Aboriginal communities; and environmental and cultural protection measures for 
137 Coates K “First Nations engagement in the energy sector in western Canada”, Paper prepared for the Indian 
Resource Council (June 2016) 17. Available at 
http://www.irccanada.ca/sites/default/files/First%20Nations%20Engagement%20in%20the%20Energy%20Sect
or%20in%20Western%20Canada.pdf (accessed 24 July 2017). 
138 Coates (2016) 10. 
139 See AER Voices of understanding: Looking through the window, 2 ed Calgary (November 2017). Available 
at https://www.aer.ca/documents/about-us/VoiceOfUnderstanding_Report.pdf (accessed 13 December 2017).  
140 Fidler C & Hitch M “Impact and benefit agreements: a contentious issue for environmental and Aboriginal 
justice” (2007) 35(2) EJ 50. 
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Aboriginal communities.141 From the corporate perspective, the purpose of IBAs is “to 
secure long-term local support” for projects;142 thus, to enable the company to obtain 
the social licence to operate.143 IBAs are relatively new in Canada and “they illustrate 
that several types of agreements exist within the investment law regime that transcend 
the prominent state-investor contract and investment treaty models”144 and shift an 
important aspect of governance to the hands of communities and the private sector 
while the government plays the role only of facilitator. 
 In Alberta, although IBAs have become institutionalized in the oil and gas sector, 
they are mostly a voluntary arrangement between companies and Aboriginal 
communities without any legal foundation. The only exception relates to Métis lands. 
Although the government retains ownership of minerals, under an accord reached with 
the Métis people, it committed to promote Métis self-governance over Métis lands and 
shall not grant mineral rights to proponents until the developers have negotiated a 
development agreement with the Métis Settlements.145  Also, under section 8 of the 
Aboriginal Consultation Levy Act (ACLA), the Minister is authorised to require a project 
proponent to disclose information about an IBA it has entered into with any Aboriginal 
community. One of the purposes of this disclosure is to assist the government in 
determining the amount of grants to be provided to Aboriginal communities. Section 4 
of ACLA also establishes a consultation levy fund to support Aboriginal communities to 
participate in consultation. 
 Although IBAs are believed to be increasingly popular in Alberta, the number of 
publicly known IBAs is negligible. A 2013 survey showed that only two IBAs were 
publicly known in Alberta, compared to 101 in Ontario, 37 in Saskatchewan, and 35 in 
British Columbia.146 While these numbers do not reflect the actual number of IBAs being 
negotiated, they send a negative message regarding transparency. The above survey 
noted that much development is occurring in the oil and gas industry in Alberta, but that 
the lack of legal requirements to disclose IBAs makes it difficult to track them.147 The 
lack of legislative mandates to negotiate them in the first place may also be influencing 
the willingness of parties to voluntarily disclose them. 
 Empirical studies on the effectiveness of IBAs are very limited. One study, which 
considered the effectiveness of 14 IBAs signed in the Northwest Territories of Canada, 
found that IBAs have “contributed to relationship-building, delivered benefits, 
141 Prno J, Bradshaw B & Lapierre D “Impact and benefit agreements: are they working?” (2010) 3. Available 
at 
http://www.impactandbenefit.com/UserFiles/Servers/Server_625664/File/IBA%20PDF/CIM%202010%20Paper
%20-%20Prno,%20Bradshaw%20and%20Lapierre.pdf (accessed 18 July 2017).  
142 Northern Development Ministers Forum (NDMF) Priority project on sustainable resource development: 
Benefits agreements in Canada’s north (August 2013). Available at http://www.nadc.gov.ab.ca/Docs/benifit-
agreements-2013.pdf (accessed 18 July 2017). 
143 Nwapi C “Legal and institutional frameworks for community development agreements in the mining sector 
in Africa” (2017) 4 EIS 203. 
144 Odumosu-Ayanu IT “Governments, investors and local communities: analysis of a multi-actor investment 
contract framework” (2014) 15(2) MJIL 473. 
145 See NDMF (2013) 13. 
146 NDMF (2013) 21. 
147 NDMF (2013) 21. 
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contributed to capacity building, and enabled follow up in a way never afforded by 
[instruments like EIAs]”.148 The study noted that not all IBA objectives were fully met 
due in large part to shortcomings in their negotiation and implementation and in 
managing community expectations.149 
In sum, although IBAs are often regarded as private contracts between the 
resource proponents and communities, when they are made a precondition to the 
granting of mineral rights, they become regulatory tools rather than mere private 
contracts. Legislatively mandated IBAs may have a greater potential to achieve the 
objectives of IBAs because they provide a greater assurance not only that IBAs will be 
negotiated but also that parties will abide by their pledges.  
 
5.5. Environmental Enforcement 
Numerous environmental offences arise from operations in the Alberta oil sands where 
substances that are harmful to the environment when improperly handled are 
frequently used. Enforcement of the offences is conducted under both federal and 
provincial laws, reflecting the shared environmental protection jurisdiction of both 
levels of government.150 Those laws contain both criminal and administrative penalties 
for violators. The violators range from small-size corporations to well-resourced 
multinational corporations, other organizations and individuals.151 
 Most environmental offences in Alberta are described as “regulatory offences”, 
“quasi-crimes” or “public welfare offences” which do not require proof of a criminal 
intent on the part of the accused.152 The main reason for creating such offences is not so 
much to punish the conduct in question as it is to promote compliance with the 
standard of conduct that the legislation or regulation seeks to uphold.153 Although such 
offences do not require fault on the part of the accused, a due diligence defence, which is 
to be established on a balance of probabilities, is always available to the accused.154 
Such offences include commencing or continuing an activity without approval where an 
approval is required, release of substances without approval or in excess of what is 
permitted, lack of or inadequate clean-up of contaminated sites, failure to report 
violations, etc.155 
 Alberta’s environmental enforcement standards are said to be among the 
strictest in the world.156 Its method of enforcement takes four forms: administrative 
penalties, warnings, orders and criminal prosecution. Administrative penalties are 
148 Prno, Bradshaw & Lapierre (2010) 9. 
149 Prno, Bradshaw & Lapierre (2010) 9. 
150At the federal level, the principal statutes are the Environmental Enforcement Act SC 2009 c 14, the Fisheries 
Act RSC 1985 c F-14, and the Migratory Birds Convention Act SC 1994 c 22. At the provincial level the 
principal statutes are the EPEA and the Water Act RSA 2000 c W-3. 
151 Nwapi (2013) 7.  
152 R v Sault Ste Marie (City) [1978] 2 SCR 1299 1303. 
153 Nwapi (2013)7. 
154 EPEA s 229.  
155 Nwapi C “Environmental sentencing policy in Alberta: a critical review”, CIRL Occasional Paper #46, 
January 2015 1.  
156 Hudec AJ & Paulus JR “Current environmental regulations of the Alberta oil and gas industry and emerging 
issues” (1990) 20 ALR 173. 
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monetary penalties that are assessed and imposed on a person by an environmental 
regulator without having recourse to the judicial process. They are used to address 
minor infractions with minimal impacts and they cannot be combined with criminal 
prosecution.157 The advantage is that they are a fast and cheap way of dealing with 
minor environmental infractions. Warnings, on the other hand, are issued to persons 
who violate environmental statutes or regulations to prompt compliance with the 
statutes or regulations. They form part of the compliance history of such a person.158 
The infractions requiring warnings must be more minor than those calling for 
administrative penalties. When immediate action is required to avoid or stop an 
adverse environmental effect, orders are issued to the person whose action is 
required.159 The last enforcement method is criminal prosecution in a court of 
competent jurisdiction, which is reserved for more serious infractions. 
Studies show that until about a decade ago environmental enforcement in 
Alberta, particularly through criminal prosecution, “was rather unsystematic”, and that 
the Alberta government channelled its energies towards defending challenges to its 
implementation of its statutory environmental obligations by the environmental 
community.160 However, things have changed. Between 2008 and 2014, about 62 
convictions were recorded from criminal prosecutions while about 197 administrative 
penalties were issued.161 
An important aspect of the enforcement culture in Alberta that merits 
consideration is sentencing. While fines and imprisonment can be imposed in 
environmental cases, imprisonment is seldom used and is reserved for more serious 
cases where it is necessary to apprehend the officers of a corporation to more 
“effectively address the root cause of the offence”.162 Also, courts believe that in 
environmental cases the principles for the imposition of fines require a “special 
approach”.163 As most environmental offences in Alberta are committed by oil and gas 
corporations many of which are well resourced, courts are instructed to imposed fines 
that amount to “more than a licensing fee for illegal activity or the cost of doing 
business”,164 presumably to achieve the deterrence goal of sentencing. The maximum 
fines provided under the EPEA are high; however, the actual fine to be imposed depends 
on several factors, namely, the seriousness of the damage caused by the offence, the 
financial capability of the offender, the offender’s degree of culpability, the offender’s 
criminal history, and the offender’s acceptance or rejection of culpability.165  
157 EPEA 273(3); Jillian Flett, “Administering environmental administrative penalties: Alberta’s experience” 
(2000) 15(1) News Brief. Available at http://elc.ab.ca/Content_Files/Files/NewsBriefs/Vol.15No.12000.pdf 
(accessed 19 July 2017). 
158 Nwapi (2013) 15. 
159 Nwapi (2013) 16. 
160 Nwapi (2013) 16. 
161 Nwapi (2015) 14. 
162 Nwapi (2015) 12. 
163 R v Kenaston Drilling (Arctic) Ltd (1973) 41 DLR (3d) 252.  
164 Terreco para 60. 
165 See R v Chem-Security (Alberta) Ltd, 1998 ABPC 96; R v Lefebvre, 1999 ABQB 523; R v Terroco Industries 
Ltd, 2005 ABCA 141. 
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Studies show a growing policy and legislative trend towards increased sentences in 
environmental cases.166 The federal Environmental Enforcement Act (EEA), enacted in 
2009, established a minimum fine structure for serious environmental offences, 
increased the maximum payable for all offences, established a separate fine scheme for 
individuals, corporations and vessels, and provided for the doubling of fines for repeat 
offenders.167 The federal fine scheme is much higher than that under Alberta’s EPEA. 
For instance, the EEA imposes a minimum fine of $15,000 on individuals that commit 
more serious offences and a maximum fine of $1 million (and/or imprisonment) 
whereas EPEA imposes a maximum fine of $100,000 (and/or imprisonment) for 
comparable offences and does not establish any minimum. For large corporations 
indicted for more serious offences, the EEA creates a minimum fine of $500,000 and a 
maximum fine of $6 million whereas the EPEA creates a maximum fine of $1 million for 
similar offences without establishing any minimum. However, even though the 
provincial fines are lower, the sentencing trend is increasingly towards moving closer to 
the maximum fines allowed – a race to the top rather than to the bottom.168 
In addition, instead of requiring that convicted offenders pay fines that go into 
government coffers, Alberta courts have adopted a creative approach that allows the 
court to order that fines be channelled to some cause that will be beneficial to the 
community, such as funding research projects dedicated to finding ways to improve the 
environment or to improve industry compliance with environmental regulations, or 
that the offender perform some service that can in some way correct the damage caused 
by the offence.169 This approach to sentencing is termed “creative sentencing”. It is 
justified on several grounds: to let some good come from bad, to give the offender an 
opportunity to help others in the same industry to avoid committing the offence, 
rehabilitation of the damaged environment, desire for compassionate punishment, 
prison congestion, and “do-goodism”.170 Creative sentencing was introduced in Alberta 
in 1993 under section 234(1) of the EPEA. Since then, it has become “a major insignia of 
sentencing policy in Alberta”.171 Between 1996 and 2013, 56 per cent of all penalties in 
environmental cases were made up of creative sentencing.172  
For creative sentencing to be ordered, however, it must be clearly authorized by 
statute.173 Also, the contents of any proposed creative sentencing agreed between the 
Crown and the offender requires the approval of the Court, which must determine 
166 See Chambers S & Semenchuk L “Trends in Alberta environmental enforcement: fines, fowl and finger-
pointing”, Paper delivered at the NEERLS Summit, Banff (2011) 11. Available at 
http://www.cba.org/cba/cle/PDF/ENV11_SemenchukChambers_Paper.pdf (accessed 21 July 2017). 
167 BecklumbP “Legislative summary: Bill C-16: Environmental Enforcement Act”, Parliamentary Information 
and Research Service (1 April 2009) 2. Available at 
http://www.lop.parl.gc.ca/Content/LOP/LegislativeSummaries/40/2/c16-e.pdf (accessed 21 July 2017). 
168 Nwapi (2015) 14. 
169 See R V United Keno Hills Mine Ltd, (1980) 10 CERL 43 (YTTC); R v Syncrude Canada Ltd (2010) ABPC 
229; Ingelson A “Creative environmental sentences in the Alberta oil and gas industry”, The Negotiator 
(February 2016) 2–6. Available at http://landman.ca/wp/wp-content/uploads/2016/02/Feb2016_Negotiator.pdf 
(accessed 21 July 2017).  
170 Cryderman (2010); Czajkoski EH & Wollan LA, Jr “Creative sentencing: a critical analysis” (1986) 3:2 JQ 
221.  
171 Nwapi (2013) 25. 
172 Nwapi (2015) 25. 
173 R v Imperial Oil, 1997 CanLII 952 (ONCA). 
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whether the agreement is consistent with the purposes of the statute.174 The sentence 
could take a variety of forms, such as ordering the offender to publish the facts relating 
to the offence, an order for community service, ordering the offender to remedy the 
harm, ordering that fines be channelled to support scientific studies that seek to 
improve the state of the environment, ordering the offender to finance academic studies 
intended to promote good corporate behaviour relevant to the offence, etc.175 
There are established guidelines for issuing creative sentences, among which are 
the following: (1) the creative sentence must be in combination with the imposition of a 
traditional fine; (2) there must be a link between the offence and the project which the 
creative sentence is meant to fund, to enable the sentence to address the harm caused 
by the offence; (3) the beneficiary of the creative sentence must be the public, and the 
public within the locality of the offence must be the primary beneficiary; (4) conflict of 
interest between the offender and the recipient of the fund as well as between the latter 
and the Crown or investigating officer must be avoided; (5) the fund recipient must be a 
not-for-profit organization, such as NGOs, universities and research institutes; and (6) 
the expected result of the project must be “concrete, tangible and measurable”.176 In 
addition, in determining the actual amount of a creative sentence, the Court is guided by 
the “totality principle”, i.e., it must ensure that the cumulative sentence (the creative 
sentence and all other fines imposed) is not disproportionate to the offence.177 Ingelson 
has argued that creative sentencing contributes to a company’s corporate social 
responsibility and is therefore one of the factors that encourage companies to 
participate in it.178 
While the trend towards routine use of creative sentencing is innovative and 
commendable, its effectiveness in Alberta has suffered some setbacks. The setbacks are 
caused by several factors, including: inadequate victim participation in the creative 
sentencing process, which has sometimes led to approval of projects that do not address 
legitimate victim concerns;179 sometimes absence of competent experts to design 
creative sentencing projects; and lack of adequate monitoring of the implementation of 
creative sentencing projects.180 Disagreements over the choice of projects to implement 
creative sentencing have also sometimes led to a compromise that produced projects 
174 McRory & Jenkins (2003). 
175 See EPEA s 234(1); R v Hillsight Vegetables Inc, [2005] AJ No 1916; ESRD, Creative sentencing in Alberta: 
2013 Report 11–14. Available at http://aep.alberta.ca/about-us/compliance-assurance-program/creative-
sentencing/documents/CreativeSentencingAlberta-2013.pdf (accessed 17 July 2017). 
176 Alberta Environment and Sustainable Resource Development & Alberta Justice and Solicitor General, 
Creative sentencing in Alberta: 2012 Report 3. Available at 
https://extranet.gov.ab.ca/env/infocentre/info/library/8831.pdf (accessed 18 July 2017).  
177 R v Ewanchuk 2010 ABCA 298 para 15 (CanLII). 
178 Ingelson A “Creative environmental sentences – the corporate perspective”, A symposium on environment in 
the courtroom (III): sentencing and environmental offences, environmental education for judges and court 
practitioners, Dalhousie University, Halifax 21–22 February 2014 14. Available at 
http://cirl.ca/files/cirl/allan_ingelson-en.pdf (accessed 18 July 2017). 
179 Cryderman K “Paying the price: ‘Creative sentencing’ option angers family of wellsite victim”, Calgary 
Herald (25 June 2010). Available at 
http://www.calgaryherald.com/business/PAYING+PRICE+Creative+sentencing+option+angers+family+wellsit
e+victim/3098118/story.html (accessed 18 July 2017). 
180 Hughes EL & Reynolds LA “Creative sentencing and environmental protection” (2009) 19(2) JELP 125. 
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that did not adequately advance the goals of the particular creative sentencing.181 
Studies acknowledge, however, that the environmental prosecution unit of Alberta 
Justice has stepped up its monitoring and oversight of the implementation of creative 
sentencing projects.182  
Overall, environmental enforcement in Alberta reveals the expanded societal 
goals that the Alberta government seeks to achieve. They can be summarized as 
promotion of respect for the law, expression of societal disapproval of environmental 
crimes, and to provide some environmental benefits beyond mere remediation of the 
damaged environment. The polluter pays principle seems to be the overriding 
governing principle. The principle ensures that the costs of repairing damage done to 
the environment is borne by those responsible for the damage and not shifted to 
taxpayers. 
6. PROPOSALS FOR TRANSPLANTING ALBERTA’S GOVERNANCE REGIME IN 
SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA 
6.1. Revisiting Legal Transplant Theory 
As noted in Section 2, legal transplant theory does not require that a foreign legal rule 
or regime be adopted wholesale, without modification. Instead, each importing 
jurisdiction is free to critically examine the foreign legal rule to determine what might 
be relevant to its own jurisdiction. This can be deduced from a combination of Watson’s 
and Kahn-Freund’s theories and from the modern views of legal transplant. Whether or 
not there are similarities between the adopting jurisdiction and the foreign jurisdiction, 
a legal transplant can still be successful if the adopting jurisdiction adopts a pragmatic 
and inward-looking approach, rather than a “legalistic spirit”, that considers the 
adaptability of the foreign rule to its own local circumstances. Even if the rule “owes its 
existence…to a distribution of power” in its home jurisdiction unshared by the adopting 
jurisdiction,183 there are still lessons for the adopting jurisdiction, even if it is only to 
learn about the spirit of the rule. I must thus reiterate that socio-political differences 
between Alberta and Sub-Saharan Africa – which certainly exist – do not render a legal 
transplant of Alberta’s governance regime for oil sands development impossible in Sub-
Saharan Africa. 
6.2. What Can Sub-Saharan Africa Transplant from Alberta? 
The first step is perhaps the development of a sustainable development strategy that 
accounts for the nature of oil sands development. None of the Sub-Saharan African 
countries with oil sands deposits mentioned in this article has an official sustainable 
development strategy, the only likely exceptions, however, being Nigeria and 
Madagascar. Nigeria’s 2009 Vision 20:2020 may be regarded as representing its official 
sustainable development strategy; however, a look at Vision document reveals that the 
181 Nwapi (2013) 31. 
182 Nwapi (2013) 31. 
183 Kahn-Freund (1974) 12. 
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economic aspects of sustainable development are much more strongly emphasised than 
the socio-environmental aspects. Madagascar has two processes in place that could be 
regarded as equivalent to a sustainable development strategy: the National 
Environmental Action Plan, launched operationally in 1991, and the Poverty Reduction 
Strategy Paper of 2003. Madagascar’s strategy, however, was formulated when oil sands 
development had not yet come into the picture, meaning that the capacity of that 
strategy to deal with sustainable development issues surrounding oil sands 
development is called into serious question. A review of that strategy is necessary to 
update it to the new realities and challenges. The principles informing the Alberta 
sustainable development strategy can be considered in its development. In addition, 
Sub-Saharan African countries should consider establishing a legal framework for its 
sustainable development strategy, which would establish implementation machinery 
for the strategy, with clear lines of responsibility. The use of a legal framework would 
give greater assurance that the strategy would be implemented. 
 Secondly, Alberta’s approach to administrative agency regulation is based on two 
key principles: independence and one-stop shop. This is the very opposite of what 
obtains in Sub-Saharan Africa. Multiplicity of regulatory agencies creates regulatory 
murkiness (due to potential overlaps of functions) and investment bottlenecks (due to 
delays caused by efforts to meet the requirements of each of the regulators and to clear 
confusions created by functional overlaps) and has been found to be a major obstacle to 
investment in Sub-Saharan Africa.184 However, a single-regulator system expedites 
project approval processes, eliminates waste, and ensures a single-minded approach to 
regulation – factors that boost investment. The value of an independent regulator “lies 
in its potential contribution to expertise in regulating oil and gas activities and a clear 
separation between government’s responsibilities as proprietor [of the resources] and 
as regulator”.185 By contrast, when a regulator is not independent of the government, it 
can lead to implementation failure because, given the thinness of the dividing line 
between the private and public sectors, the economic interests of government officials 
could easily coincide with those of businesses.186 This has been identified as a major 
bane of development in Sub-Saharan Africa, one that goes hand in glove with 
corruption.187 
Perhaps the most important lesson to be learnt from the governance regime for 
oil sands development in Alberta is the adoption of a deliberative and collaborative 
approach to policy-making, planning and decision-making. This approach is aimed at 
promoting dialogue not only between resource developers and the public but also with 
184 See eg, USAID “Madagascar environmental threats and opportunities assessment – 2014 update” 72. 
Available at www.usaidgems.org/Documents/FAA&Regs/FAA118119/Madagascar2014.pdf (accessed 18 July 
2017); Ingelson A & Nwapi C “Environmental impact assessment for oil, gas and mining projects in Nigeria: a 
critical analysis” (2014) 10:1 LEADJ 54. 
185 Odumosu (2007) 898. 
186 Ikpeze NI, Soludo CC & Elekwa NN “Nigeria: the political economy of the policy process, policy choice 
and implementation” in Soludo CC, Ogbu O & Chang H (eds) The politics of trade and industrial policy in 
Africa: forced consensus? (Trenton: Africa World Press 2004) 345. 
187 Nwapi C “Enhancing the effectiveness of transparency in extractive resource governance: a Nigerian case 
study” (2014) 7(1) LDR 38. 
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the energy regulator, with a view to building consensus on vital issues affecting 
stakeholders. The major locale of this deliberation is the EIA process. Although 
Aboriginal consultation in Alberta has a colonial and constitutional history and has 
followed the evolution of environmental democracy in Canada, it is not entirely alien to 
the present situation in Sub-Saharan Africa given the presence of legal provisions for 
public participation in EIA laws for resource projects in Sub-Saharan Africa. However, 
these provisions are not nearly as developed as in Alberta, particularly regarding 
Aboriginal consultation which enjoys strong constitutional protection. While there are 
no Aboriginal (or indigenous) peoples in the Sub-Saharan African countries mentioned 
in this article – as that term is understood in Canada – the local communities where oil 
sands development activities occur in those countries may be facing problems akin to 
those faced by Aboriginal peoples in Canada. Those problems include alienation from 
their traditional lands and disruption of their traditional means of livelihood. Sub-
Saharan Africa can learn from Canada’s highly evolved system of Aboriginal 
consultation to strengthen the participation of local communities impacted by oil sands 
development. The creation of a participant funding scheme to “level the playing field” 
for all participants by enhancing the ability of the communities to participate in those 
processes should be considered, as studies show that this is a major obstacle to effective 
public participation in most of Sub-Saharan Africa.188  
Furthermore, there are good reasons for centralised decision-making in oil and 
gas development. In Sub-Saharan Africa, as in Alberta, where oil and gas resources are 
owned by the public rather than by individuals or sections of the public, the entire 
public has a legitimate claim to share in the benefits flowing from the resources and 
therefore to the collective management of the resources. This ensures consistency of 
regulatory standards regardless of the location of the resources.189 It also ensures that 
local or sectional interests do not trump collective interests. However, some degree of 
local governance seems appropriate given that the locality where the development 
activities occur is usually disproportionately impacted by the negative externalities of 
such activities. Governments at the local level are in a better position than national 
governments to deal with local concerns.190 Although local governance of oil and gas 
resources in Alberta is, from a legal perspective, very limited, my earlier analysis shows 
that a consciously moulded good faith relationship and commitment, outside the legal 
sphere, between the provincial government and municipalities would improve project 
approval processes in a way that gives municipalities a greater voice in oil and gas 
decision-making. The encouragement of IBAs is one way in which the province ensures 
that local Aboriginal communities participate in decisions regarding how to address the 
impacts of oil sands development. This approach is however not foreign to Sub-Saharan 
Africa, where Community Development Agreements – which are akin to IBAs – are 
becoming prevalent in mineral development.191 In Nigeria, they are even mandated by 
the Minerals and Mining Act, 2007. What will make the difference is how well the 
188  See Nwapi C “Governance considerations relating to social impact assessments for mining development in 
African communities” (2015) 17(2) JEAPM 19. 
189 Vlavianos & Thompson (2010) 56–57. 
190 Vlavianos & Thompson (2010) 56–57. 
191 See Nwapi (2017). 
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government supports the communities to negotiate such agreements effectively. 
Alberta’s participant funding scheme – which is not popular in Sub-Saharan Africa – 
might be relevant to Sub-Saharan African countries. 
Lastly, Alberta has not only devoted substantial resources to enforcement of 
environmental laws but has developed a creative approach to environmental sentencing 
to ensure that some societal good emanates from environmental violations. I do not 
consider it realistic though that Sub-Saharan African countries would be as stringent in 
environmental enforcement as Alberta, given that they are developing economies in 
dire need of foreign direct investment (FDI) while Alberta is a developed economy. As 
developing economies, they do not possess adequate negotiating power to demand 
strict compliance with environmental laws while at the same time attracting 
investment. However, within the negotiating space available to them, they certainly 
have the capacity to employ the creative approach Alberta is utilizing in environmental 
sentencing to promote greater environmental stewardship. As their economy grows and 
reliance on FDI declines, they will correspondingly tighten their environmental 
enforcement. 
7. CONCLUSION 
The unconventional nature of oil sands development comes with its own governance 
challenges. Those challenges are likely to be very significant for Sub-Saharan Africa, a 
region that is still struggling to grapple with the challenges posed by conventional oil 
development despite several decades of experience. To develop the resources in a 
sustainable manner, Sub-Saharan Africa must strive to put its governance houses in 
order before embarking on actual exploitation of the resources. Given its inexperience 
with oil sands development, it would be judicious for Sub-Saharan African countries to 
examine other jurisdictions with experience to see what lessons they might draw that 
might be relevant to their own jurisdictions. 
Alberta is the only jurisdiction in the world with substantial experience in oil 
sands development. Its governance regime for the oil sands can be described as based 
on six key approaches: (1) the adoption of a clear whole-of-government sustainable 
development strategy that is attuned to the nature of oil sands development; (2) the 
adoption of a “single-regulator” framework and the establishment of an independent 
quasi-judicial regulatory agency to oversee the regulation; (3) the encouragement of 
dialogue between resource developers and the public through the requirement of 
Aboriginal consultation in EIAs and project approval processes; (4) a willingness to 
recognise the importance of local governance of oil and gas resources, and to facilitate 
processes that give local governments a voice in oil and gas decision-making beyond 
what is mandated by formal law; (5) the encouragement of IBAs and the provision of 
participant funding schemes to assist Aboriginal communities in negotiating them; and 
(6) a willingness to enforce environmental laws based on the polluter pays principle, 
and a creative approach to doing so. What is most innovative about Alberta’s approach 
is, perhaps, how the government increasingly assumes the role of facilitator of dialogue 
among private resource developers, the public and the regulatory agency. It is these 
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governance features that I suggest that Sub-Saharan African countries with oil sands 
deposits should consider as they prepare to exploit the resources.  
However, one cannot assume that the Alberta governance regime can be easily 
transplanted into Sub-Saharan Africa, given the contextual differences between Alberta 
and Sub-Saharan African countries. What legal transplant theory tells us, however, is 
that it is possible for a successful transplant to occur regardless of any institutional, 
cultural, political and other sociological differences between Alberta and Sub-Saharan 
Africa. The decisive factor is the willingness of the adopting jurisdiction to identify what 
would be relevant to it and to adapt the imported rule to its own local condition. Sub-
Saharan African countries can do it. 
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